mit.edu
Live email deliverability and anti-spoofing audit. Every value below was read from public DNS at the moment this page was generated.
61/100 — Workable, but mail from this domain is more likely to land in spam than it needs to be. Accepts mail · Spoofable: anyone can forge this sender · Hosted by Microsoft 365
Findings
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spf
More than one SPF record is published, which makes SPF evaluation fail entirely.
2 records
Fix: Merge them into a single TXT record starting with v=spf1.
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mx redundancy
Only one mail exchanger is published, so there is no failover.
mit-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com
Fix: Add a secondary MX at a higher priority number.
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dmarc
DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none), so spoofed mail is still delivered.
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@mit.edu
Fix: Move to p=quarantine and then p=reject once your reports show only legitimate senders failing.
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mta sts
No MTA-STS policy, so inbound mail can be downgraded to an unencrypted connection.
Fix: Publish _mta-sts.mit.edu and host a policy at https://mta-sts.mit.edu/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
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mx
Mail is handled by Microsoft 365.
100 mit-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com
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dkim
DKIM keys found for 8 selectors.
google._domainkey, selector2._domainkey, k1._domainkey, k2._domainkey, s1._domainkey, s2._domainkey, mandrill._domainkey, hs1._domainkey
Records
| MX | 100 mit-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com |
|---|---|
| SPF | v=spf1 include:mail.mythoshq.com ~all |
| DMARC | v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@mit.edu |
| DKIM selectors | google, selector2, k1, k2, s1, s2, mandrill, hs1 |
| MTA-STS | not published |
| TLS-RPT | not published |
| BIMI | not published |
| DNSSEC | not validating |
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